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WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FoR?

By John H. Garvey. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1996. Pp. viii, 312. $35.

1988, Jeffrey Kendall and Barbara Zeitler Kendall were mar
ried.1 Though Jeffrey was Catholic at the time and Barbara was
Jewish, the couple agreed to raise their children in Barbara's faith.
In 1991, Jeffrey joined Boston Church of Christ, a fundamentalist
Christian church. The tenets of that faith include a belief that those
who do not accept Jesus Christ are damned to Hell, where there
will be "weeping and gnashing of teeth." Barbara's faith also un
derwent a change during the marriage: she became an Orthodox
Jew. Citing irreconcilable differences, the Kendalls sought a di
vorce in November, 1994.
Before their marriage dissolved, the Kendalls had three chil
dren, all of whom were under ten at the time of the divorce. In the
divorce petition, Barbara sought to restrict Jeffrey's ability to ex
pose the children to his fundamentalist faith. The probate court
was then faced with a choice: it could deny this aspect of Barbara's
petition or it could order such a restriction and thereby appear to
endorse one religion over the other. Reasoning that it was acting in
the best interests of the children, the divorce court prohibited Jef
frey from taking his children to church, exposing them to Bible
study, or otherwise expressing to them his religious views, if such
activities alienated the children from their Jewish self-identity or
from their mother, or if the activities caused the children emotional
harm. Though it had no evidence that any present harm had come
to the children, the court nevertheless found that the likelihood of
future substantial psychological harm was sufficient to justify the
restriction. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld
the order.
Reflecting the increasing number of interfaith marriages2 - and
subsequent interfaith divorces that potentially put courts in the po
sition of deciding between allegedly irreconcilable but abstractly
"good" religious practices - the Kendall case provides fertile
ground for examining John H. Garvey's new study of constitutional
freedom, What Are Freedoms For? In most of this book, Garvey
aims to debunk the most common conception of freedoms: that
they are "rights to make choices" (p. 1). In philosophical terms,
this conception is expressed by the phrase "the right is prior to the
In

1. All the following facts are related in Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 & nn.47 (Mass. 1997).
2. See Robert Marquand, Kids' Choice ofReligion in Divorce, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 12, 1997, at 1, 9 (reporting that more than 50% of Buddhists and Jews, 40% of Muslims,
and 30 to 40% of Catholics marry outside their faith).
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good," where the right in question is the right to make a choice (p.
1). Under this approach, the Constitution's guarantees of freedom
are intended to permit each person to decide for himself what is the
good and how to achieve it.
In opposition to this conception of freedom, Garvey argues that
the good is prior to the right. He envisions freedom "as a right to
act [in particular ways], not a right to choose" (p. 2). He thus dis
tinguishes autonomy from freedom. He also believes that some ac
tions are better than others, and that the Constitution gives
freedom to perform such actions without government interference
because they are better.
Garvey recognizes the difficult task he has set for himself: he
acknowledges that the first view of freedom has become orthodox.
His strategy therefore is patient and meticulous. In chapter after
chapter, he acknowledges the now-conventional view, often admit
ting its prima fade merits. He then offers his competing concep
tion, attempting to demonstrate that it is a superior explanation of
the law of constitutional freedoms.
Using Kendall v. Kendall.3
a case in which two religions came
into conflict - as a foil, this Notice examines Garvey's theory of
freedom particularly as it relates to religion.4 Part I sets forth Gar
vey's general argument in regard to freedom of religion. Part II
describes Garvey's views on the freedom children achieve through
their representatives. Part III analyzes Kendall on Garvey's terms
and concludes that while Garvey's theory does have some explana
tory power, it may not perfectly capture the dynamic at stake in
'
cases like Kendall.
-

I.

FREEDOM

Garvey largely rejects the idea that constitutional freedom has
the purpose of allowing choice, or a zone of autonomy.5 Because
"autonomy is a moral ideal, [and] freedom is a legal rule" (p. 6),
Garvey concedes that freedom might conceivably be a way of set
ting up the legal rules to ensure autonomy. Such a concept of free3. 687 N.E.2d 1228.
4. Garvey does not confine his discussion to religion. He also focuses on freedom of
association and freedom of speech.
5. P. 12. Garvey notes two arguments that posit choice as the ultimate value. Tue auton
omy theory holds that "each person is an end in himself, a kind of sovereign over a kingdom
of one." P. 23. Following others' orders, as opposed to making one's own choices, would
violate this sovereignty. In contrast, the political theory stresses the idea that people disagree
irreconcilably "about whether some forms of life are better than others." To achieve demo
cratic stability of government such questions are removed from the lawmakers' table and left
to the choice of individuals. P. 23. Garvey cites no sources for these views and the reader
suspects immediately that perhaps, even under these views, choice is valued only in a limited
subset of cases and not in a sweeping range of cases.
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dom, however, would need to be extremely broad6 and both
bilateral and universal in character.7 Without such a broad concep
tion of freedom, autonomy would not be possible, because it would
be impossible to achieve unanimous and voluntary consent to the
legal rules. If choice or autonomy were the ultimate value, dissent
would arise from legal rules informed by a narrower conception of
freedom because these rules would protect some choices but not
others.
Garvey points out that we do not have such a broad conception
of freedom. Freedom is particular and not universal (p. 12). The
Constitution protects only certain kinds of freedom. "[T]he law
does not give us any special freedom to hunt, fish, drink whiskey,
shoot pool, or work for Toyota" (p. 13).
Freedom is also not necessarily bilateral. Not every act has an
opposing act that people might choose (p. 17). Reproductive free
dom8 might include the right to abortion and the right to childbear
ing. But it might not. Abortion, Garvey points out, might also not
be considered a reproductive choice at all, but rather its antithesis.
Thus, a right to childbearing would not necessarily entail a right to
an abortion (p. 18). Similarly, a right to religion does not entail a
right to atheism (p. 40). Each action requires its own justification.
Freedoms do not come in pairs a priori; they must be paired (p. 39).
Because our concept of freedom is so limited, autonomy cannot
be its sole purpose. Instead, Garvey argues, freedom's purpose is to
protect particular ways of acting that we deem good: "[F]reedoms
allow us to engage in certain kinds of actions that are particularly
valuable. The law leaves us free to do x because it is a good thing to
do x" (p. 19).
Garvey uses freedom of religion to illustrate his point about the
purpose of freedom. He contrasts two approaches to religious free
dom, the Agnostic Viewpoint and the Believer's Viewpoint. The for
mer posits autonomy as the underlying purpose of freedom of
religion (pp. 42-49). Under this view, religious decisions are one
way - but only one way - in which we shape our lives and express
our individual humanity and identity. For this purpose, the truth
6. The view that autonomy requires a very broad conception of freedom may be no more
than a straw man. On the other hand, the argument Garvey espouses is not limited to how
widely one defines the type of choice freedom permits. In such a dispute, the relevant issue is
what counts as a choice about religion, or a choice about reproduction. Garvey will deny that
"choice" is an improper term to describe those particularly valued activities in which people
engage.
7. It would need to be bilateral in the sense that freedom to act in a particular way would
necessarily entail freedom to act in the opposite way. It would need to be universal in the
sense of being sufficiently applicable to a wide number of activities so as to provide an equal
measure of freedom for all the various actions a citizen might think important.
8. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (recognizing marriage
and procreation as fundamental rights).
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and value of particular religious decisions are unimportant. Partic
ular outcomes are unimportant. The value lies in the choice. For
this reason, one religious choice is accepting God. Choosing to re
ject Him, however, is as good a choice as acceptance.
Garvey rejects the Agnostic Viewpoint on several grounds, in
cluding the mistaken conception of personhood that it assumes (p.
44), its inconsistency with the experience of believers (p. 46), and its
inconsistency with existing legal doctrine.9 First, the Agnostic
Viewpoint posits an essential self unburdened by "habitual convic
tions and desires" (p. 44). This self can examine its convictions and
desires, rejecting those that conflict with the selfs idea of what life
should be like and accepting those that are congruent. Garvey
questions both whether this examination is possible and whether it
is desirable.10 Second, the viewpoint does not match the experience
of many believers. They do not experience belief as a choice:
"[F]aith is a gift" (p. 51). Furthermore, at least some would contest
the definition of freedom: "[I]t is accurate to say that Christian
freedom consists not in making our own [value] choices but in
obeying the law of God" (p. 46). The believer does not cherish his
freedom because it allows him to make value choices, but rather
because it permits him to obey God. Lastly, Garvey points out that
the viewpoint does not match existing legal doctrine.11 While be
lievers and nonbelievers are sometimes accorded equal protection,
this is not always true.12 In some cases, believers get special
protection.
Garvey's alternative to the Agnostic Viewpoint is the Believer's
Viewpoint. The value underlying freedom of religion here is the
shared moral belief that religion and the acts associated with it are
good things (p. 49). Freedom permits a person to achieve these
goods and to do these good acts without governmental interference.
Presumably, by contrast, the government could freely interfere with
the vast range of activities constituting nonbelief and nonreligion.
9. He also questions whether the choice to reject God is appropriately characterized
an act "of religion " protected by the First Amendment's text. P. 43.

as

10. This vision of humanity is entirely at odds, for one example, with the Christian no
tions of grace and of original sin, the "inability to master sinful desires and to freely will
doing good." P. 45.
11. As a general matter, Garvey's analysis is somewhat slippery. When current constitu
tional law matches Garvey's theory, he cites it to prove his theory is right, by which he means
it has more explanatory power. Other times he notes the divergence-of the Supreme Court
decisions and his theory, yet still argues that he is right. It is not clear in such cases what he
means by right. Perhaps Garvey "take[s] seriously . . . the possibility that there are right
answers to political-moral problems. " MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CoNSTITUTION, THE CoURTS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 102 (1982).
12. Garvey points out, for example, that the law still protects religions from discrimina
tion and exempts religions from certain obligations solely because they are religions. Pp. 54,
192-93.
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The Believer's Viewpoint also recognizes that religion, as a gen
eral matter, requires freedom (pp. 50-54). One. cannot, after all,
coerce faith, and interference with the acquisition and dissemina
tion of religious knowledge would inhibit the search for truth.
From the perspective of the individual believer, religion also re
quires freedom because it is particularly cruel for a government to
subject a person to dire otherworldly spiritual consequences by in
terfering with religious practice (p. 52) and because it is offensive to
God to do so (p. 53).
Garvey acknowledges that only some people will find such rea
sons convincing and that these people will tend to be believers (p.
54). He has several answers to this charge. First, he notes that eve
rybody - believers and nonbelievers alike - benefits from free
dom from coercion and from noninterference with truth-seeking.
The government may not prevent believers from engaging in their
religious observances, but it may not compel an agnostic to partici
pate in any such observances either (p. 53). Second, Garvey reiter
ates his criticism that the Agnostic Viewpoint is no more neutral
than the Believer's Viewpoint, because it, too, rests on assumptions
that only some people can accept.13 Finally, he argues that the Be
liever's Viewpoint has more explanatory power. The Agnostic
Viewpoint offers no reasons why autonomy with regard to religion
is protected but autonomy with regard to cigarette smoking is not
(pp. 45, 49). The Believer's Viewpoint at least can answer this
question.
JI.

CHILDREN, REPRESENTATIVES, AND FREEDOM

In his discussion of children and freedom, Garvey starts with the
observation that "[t]he constitutional rules about freedoms don't
work well for [children and others who are legally incompetent]"
(p. 82). Garvey rejects in part one explanation for this phenome
non - a utilitarian view that the consequences of freedom are
more grave for children (p. 82). Instead, Garvey argues that chil
dren's limited ability to engage in practical reasoning is a better ex
planation (p. 82). Thus, "[o]ur moral intuitions suggest that a
child's freedom is less important than an adult's, not just that it is
more often outweighed" by grave consequences.14
His proof that we value adults' freedom differently lies in the
way we balance, in particular cases, freedom and the adverse conse13. P. 56; see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text {describing notions of personhood
and the experience of belief that the Agnostic Viewpoint entails).
14. Pp. 84-85. Garvey has a disconcerting habit of making declarations of what "our"
intuitions are and are not. See, e.g., p. 27 {discussing "our intuitions about random sexual
conduct"). The title of one review of What Are Freedoms For? seems to question how widely
shared some of Garvey's declared .intuitions are. See Alan E. Brownstein, The Freedom Not
to Be John Garvey, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 767 {1998).
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quences flowing from keeping an activity free from governmental
interference. In the case of adults, two principles guide this balanc
ing: the harm principle and the least-restrictive-alternative rule.
The harm principle sets a maximum threshold of harms that we are
willing to tolerate as a consequence of the exercise of freedom. The
constitutional requirement that the government show a "compelling
state interest" embodies this principle: the state has a compelling
interest in preventing only those harms above the threshold and so
may restrict the freedom that gives rise to these harms' occur
rence.15 The least-restrictive-alternative rule "holds that even when
an activity causes significant harm the government must be careful
not to overregulate" (p. 85). Children's freedom is shown to be
different not because the principles used to balance are different,
but because we tolerate fewer harms and permit more restrictions
on children.16 The freedom that children enjoy is thus less expan
sive than adults' freedom - and obviously much less expansive
than that which autonomy requires.
The reason for the lower value placed on children's freedom has
its root, according to Garvey, in responsibility. Drawing on the
criminal law, Garvey argues that the law generally respects the abil
ity to choose by pu¢shillg only those capable of conforming their
actions to the dictates of the law.17 Garvey does not, however, deny
children's ability to choose. Rather, he says "[w]e are inclined to
say about children that though they can make choices, they are not
very good at choosing; they habitually choose the wrong things" (p.
91). Therefore, he goes on to say, "we excuse children not because
they can't choose but because they can't make the right choices" (p.
91), and "[t]hose who are too young or too disordered to under
stand the difference between good and bad have no need of free
dom."18 Why? Because freedom, to recall, "is valuable because it
allows us to do good things" (p. 95).
15. Pp. 276-77 nn.12-13 (citing cases).
16. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) ("The state's authority
over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults.").
17. The law respects choice by punishing the wrong choices. Garvey acknowledges the
counterintuitive nature of this claim, but he does not make what appears to be an obvious
connection to a Christian's finding freedom in obeying God. See supra text accompanying
note 11.
18. P. 95. Thus, in the case of freedom of speech, Garvey is willing to suppress some
points of view for children, because doing so helps "to make sure children can recognize the
good, the true, and the beautiful." P. 104. Children have representatives precisely to make
good choices for them. For this reason, Garvey would no doubt reject the Kendall court's
reliance on the children's identifying themselves as Jewish and in one instance "choosing" to
study Orthodox Judaism. Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (Mass. 1997). These
factors are not terribly relevant: the fact that the children have chosen an objective good religion - does not mean that they consistently can choose the good. That is why their
representatives make all the choices for them and this scenario renders the children free.
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To overcome his inability to make the right choices, a child must
achieve freed0m through a representative who can make such
choices. Thus, "[t]he real question [becomes] who his representa
tive should be - parents or the state" (p. 117). Parent representa
tives are superior to government representatives because their ties
to the child, the likelihood that the child's interests overlap with the
parents', and the absence of objective standards to guide a govern
mental decisionmaker all point to a kind of functional consent be
tween parent and child that does not exist with the government.19
Government intervention, on the other hand, may succeed in

mak[ing] children more free vis-a-vis their parents, [but it] makes chil
dren less free in their relations with the state. If a child is in danger of
being overwhelmed by his parents' Islam, exposing him to Sunday
School and pork chops might assist his choice of a religion when he
comes of age. But the purpose of the Constitution's guarantee of reli
gious liberty is to protect people from the government, not [from]
their relatives.
. . . The Constitution requires, as a general rule, that the government withdraw from these cases. [p. 122]

Garvey claims that children have freedom "in the constitutional
sense when relatives or friends act for them," but they are not free
when governmental agencies or judges act for them (p. 113).

Accordingly, Garvey disapproves of the dominant model that
permits courts to review choices of the child's representative under
a purportedly objective standard like best interests of the child. He
finds a subjective model more consistent with the Constitution.
Under this model, the family representative defines what is good
for the child according to the representative's own standards (p.
117). This model is particularly attractive when applied to decisions
about which there are no objective standards, such as matters in
volving the child's education or religious upbringing.20

III.

GARVEY AND

Kendall

This Part applies Garvey's theory to some of the questions
raised by Kendall v. Kendall. Section III.A resolves a threshold is
sue by acknowledging that the ruling is in fact a constraint that in
volves the First Amendment. Section III.B argues that at first
glance Garvey's theory requires the government to withdraw, but
19. Garvey says the proper metaphor is a republic where people are considered self
governing because they elect the representatives who do the governing. Parents are
"elected" by virtue of their ties to the child. P. 119.
20. Garvey contrasts such decisions with decisions about health care issues. For the lat
ter, the objective model is somewhat more palatable "because there are certain primary
goods (life, health, the absence of pain) that any rational person would want. " P. 116. Nev
ertheless, even if he concedes that these goods are primary, Garvey explains that some peo
ple value other things as well, some more highly than the identified primary goods. For this
reason, he prefers the subjective approach. P. 116.
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points to elements in Garvey's thinking that undermine such a hasty
conclusion. It concludes that Garvey's simple dichotomy of Agnos
tic and Believer's Viewpoints does not fully capture what is at stake
in Kendall.
A.

Constraints

In the second part of- his book,21 which is considerably more dis
cursive than the first, Garvey constructs a taxonomy of government
constraints. He makes the point that what counts as a constraint
ought to be a critical threshold issue (p. 166). Only constraints and
not other measures need to be justified by compelling state
interests.
With regard to this threshold issue, the Kendall court forbade
Jeffrey to expose his children to his religious beliefs because the
court believed its order to be in the best interests of the children.
In doing so, the court admitted that it constrained Jeffrey's free
dom,22 though its admission was not without reservation.23 Even
had the court not characterized its order as a constraint, Garvey's
theory provides two reasons for thinking that it is.24 First, any bur
den on Jeffrey in his role as representative is therefore a burden on
the rights of his three children to free exercise - at least of Jeffrey's
religion.25 To recall, a child is free in the constitutional sense when
21. The second half of Garvey's book tackles the other side of the freedom coin. His
argument on this score is lengthy and complex and not particularly relevant to the Kendall
case, so this Notice will leave it to the reader. Suffice it to say, because Garvey argues that
freedom has a moral aspect in that it gives us freedom to do good acts, he recognizes a flip
side: that a government that interferes with freedom is doing not simply an amoral, but a
positively bad act. P. 2.
22. See Kendall, 687 N.E.2d at 1235 (noting that constraint is permissible if justified by a
compelling government interest). The court was somewhat schizophrenic, however, because
it conflated the existence of a constraint with whether it ts justified. See, e.g., Kendall, 687
N.E.2d at 1236 (explaining that the restriction is not a constraint because it is for a secular
purpose, a logical non sequitur). Later the court denied both that it had burdened the prac
tice of religion and that it had "established Judaism" as the children's religion as forbidden by
the Frrst Amendment. Kendal� 687 N.E.2d at 1236. If it had not constrained the practice of
religion, it would not have needed to mention - much less show - that there was a compel
ling government interest, the best interest of the Kendall children. Thus, it is safe to conclude
that the court believed it had burdened the practice of religio�, but that the burden was
justified.
23. The court hedged by stating that, technically, it had not burdened Jeffrey's exercise ·at
all. He remained free to pray and follow whatever religious observances he wished. To the
extent religious observances include proselytizing and other evangelical work, the court's
conclusion seems plainly mistaken.
24. It is unclear from the Kendall decision which parent had legal custody or whether the
custody was joint. The matter, however, is not strictly important to this analysis. The selec
tion of one parent over the other as the child's representative, if done in part because the
chosen parent's religion is ostensibly the same as the expresse.d religion of the children,
would amount in effect to the same type of restriction the court in fact imposed in this case.
25. The Supreme Court's decisions, while not unequivocal, appear to support Garvey's
point. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (distinguishing be
tween regulation of religion qua religion and generally applicable rules and holding that only
·

.

1614

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1606

his representative is free to make choices for the child in what the
representative believes to be the child's best interest.
Second, to Garvey, the essence of constraint is intention.26 He
distinguishes among three types of intention; in Garvey's taxonomy,
laws of the first two kinds are constraints:
1. In the easiest case . . .the government forbids people to do x
because it thinks that x is bad . . ..
2. More typical is the case where the government forbids x as a
means to some other end .... The government not only foresees that
x will be abridged, but actually tries to bring that about [even though]
[i]t might do so with genuine regret. ...
3. . . . [T]he impact on x [may be] only a side effect, not a means.
[pp. 21 2-1 3]
Kendall represents the second type. The court forbade the practice
of religion qua religion to produce its desired end. It did not, for
example, prohibit nonreligious denigration of Barbara. Instead, it
singled out religion - an ironic, backhanded recognition of what
Garvey believes, that religion is "special" (p. 45). The court's order
was, therefore, a constraint on free exercise and needed to be justi
fied by a compelling state interest.27
B.

Justifications

According to Garvey, freedom gives us the space in which to do
good acts. Exercise of religion is one such intrinsically good act.
Freedom is the legal rule that gives people the opportunity to pur
sue this good. As a general rule, government ought to withdraw
from situations involving religious decisionmaking for children in
favor of decisionmaking by representatives.28 At first glance, the
Kendall court appears to have fl.outed the general rule.
the latter are not constraints). The Kendall court burdens religion qua religion. While it
purports to be acting in the child's best interest, it regulates only exposure to religion and not
exposure to other behaviors that might also lead to distress. See Kendall, 687 N.E.2d at 1231.
Furthermore, Smith explicitly retains the old test from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
402-03 {1963) (requiring that governmental actions that substantially burden a religious prac
tice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest) for "individualized decisions"
- which the best-interest-of-the-child test assuredly is. Finally, Smith notes the Court's par
ticular solicitude for "hybrid situations" in which, as in Kendall, the law in question burdens
both the freedom of religion and another right, such as a parent's right to control his child's
schooling or upbringing. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing, inter alia, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972)).
26. Pp. 216-17 ("Bad intentions have an intrinsic significance; they are part of what it
means to violate the Constitution."). This conclusion follows from his argument that the
government has a duty not to interfere, not simply a lack of power to interfere. See supra
note 22.
27. This conclusion is true regardless of the government's purported interest; that interest
could justify the constraint, but it could not make it any less of a constraint.
28. P. 122. Indeed, his argument is stronger: the government has a moral duty to with
draw. See supra notes 22, 25.
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Nevertheless, four concepts more or less implicit in Garvey's
thinking might seem to support the court's decision. Although in
the end, Garvey's theory generally upholds application of the gen
eral rule in a case like Kendall, it is worth considering the four con
cepts, which follow. First, it may make sense to argue that there is
no equivalence between a religion that says others will burn in Hell
and a religion that does not do ·so. The secular worship of tolerance
appears to prohibit equating the two. Second, Garvey's solicitude
for representatives suggests that the government ought also to have
respected the wishes of Barbara. Withdrawing from the decision
was not neutral in this sense; it showed disrespect for Barbara's
freedom. Third, because the freedom at stake in Kendall may be
characterized as the child's and not the parent's freedom,29 Gar
vey's conclusion that children have less freedom may make the
court's intervention more palatable constitutionally. Fourth, ac
knowledging that religion is a good does not necessarily mean that
more religion is better, or even also good. Indeed, Garvey makes
much of rejecting choice. The following paragraphs in tum describe
how Garvey's theory ultimately rejects three of these four reasons
despite their facial plausibility, and proves inconclusive in answer
ing the fourth.
Evaluating Religions. The modem ethic of tolerance might call
for courts to decide that a tolerant religion should be favored over
an intolerant one. While the court did not, of course, announce
that it had made an evaluation of the Kendall parents' respective
religions on this basis,30 the district court's findings nonetheless in
cluded numerous references to the belief of Jeffrey's church that
nonbelievers will burn in Hell, that there will be "weeping and
gnashing of teeth," and that Jeffrey Kendall vowed never to stop
trying to get his children to accept Jesus Christ. Despite the fact
that the probate court found that "leav[ing] each parent free to ex
pose the children . . . to his or her religion"31 would substantially
damage the children, it detailed no written findings on Barbara's
faith and did not refer to its tenets, despite the fact that Barbara's
faith, too, had shifted, from Reform to Orthodox Judaism. It seems
possible that Barbara's religion may also have tenets that implicitly
or explicitly denigrate the father. The whole concept of the Chosen
People, for example, conceivably denigrates Jeffrey as "unchosen."
The court did not examine this issue, and this lack of reflection em
bodies the fears of Garvey and those who think like him: "[This
decision] is also an invitation for judges to do what the Constitution
29.

See Kendall,

687 N.E.2d at 1234 (so characterizing the issue).

30. See Kendal� 687 N.E.2d at 1236 (claiming that the restriction's focus is on the physical
and emotional well-being of the child, not on the merits of the parents' respective religions).
31.

See Kendal�

687 N.E.2d at 1231 (emphasis added).
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doesn't want them to do - discriminate on the basis of the content
of religion."32 Thus despite one's temptation to evaluate on the ba
sis of tolerance, Garvey rejects government evaluation of religious
truth claims. By this measure, at least, Kendall is not a special case
and Garvey would apply the general rule of governmental
noninterference.
Protecting Barbara. Barbara is as much the representative of
her children as Jeffrey is. The children's freedom, therefore, ac
cording to Garvey's model, also lies in Barbara's freedom to do for
them what she thinks best. Inaction by the court, then, would not
have been a neutral stance at all, but rather a loaded one that would
have failed to protect Barbara's freedom - and by extension the
children's. Alternatively, governmental action might have been
necessary to prevent a situation in which neither representative
could exercise the children's freedom effectively because of the
other's interference.
In contexts unrelated to the Kendall case, Garvey recognizes the
strength of this argument.33 This recognition suggests at first that
application of his theory to Kendall might lead to the conclusion
that there is no neutral stance consistent with freedom. Govern
ment inaction would not have been neutral from Barbara's perspec
tive. The court's order was not neutral, because although it
purported to use a neutral standard, the best interest of the child,
this standard presumes an Agnostic Viewpoint.34 A radically neu
tral outcome, in which neither parent may expose the children to
his or her religion, or in which the court orders the children ex
posed to a third religion - say, Buddhism - is also radically un
free, like · living, Garvey says, under an "evenhanded despot" (p.
190).
Garvey's theory would not accept this suggestion. While he
would recognize that from Barbara's perspective government inac
tion was not neutral, he would deny that it was constitutionally un
free. The Constitution, he points out in other contexts, regulates
32. Marquand, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting University of Michigan Law School Professor
Carl Schneider) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. In a discussion of free speech, for example, Garvey notes that, to the speaker, it
makes no difference whether it is the government or a private actor that burdens speech. He
therefore makes a plausible straw-man argument that the Constitution might require that the
government step in to protect speakers from content-based restraints on speech by private
actors-actors like Jeffrey Kendall. P. 246. Garvey calls this theory the "public interest"
theory of the public function argument. Pp. 247-48. He attributes the theory to the now
overruled Supreme Court decision in Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza,
391 U.S. 308 {1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 {1976). Garvey subse
quently demolishes this superficially attractive straw man. Pp. 251-59.
34. Commentators have pointed out that the standard is not neutral in practice. See gen
erally Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1 {1987).
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freedom as against the state; it does not protect private citizens
from other citizens and so does not protect Barbara from her ex
husband's p ersuasions. The government's moral duty is noninter
ference. This duty does not extend to preventing nongovernmental
interferences. Protecting Barbara's freedom also does not make
Kendall a s pecial case under Garvey's theory.
The Freedom of Children. Another reason that suggests Kendall
may not be an easy case under Garvey's theory is his belief that we
do not value children's freedom as much as adults'. Because it is
the children's and not the parents' free exercise that the court pur
ported to impair, the court was neither bound by the least
restrictive-means test nor required to adhere to as high a harm
threshold as it would have were an adult's more valuable freedom
at stake. The court needed less reason to impose a constraint on a
child's freedom.35
In a general sense, Garvey grants this possibility. He acknowl
edges that there are relatives who do not make good representa
tives and whose choices for the children could be "callous, selfish,
or downright evil."36 In such cases, "there is a comp elling state in
terest in overriding" the child's - and the representative's - claim
to freedom.37 Indeed, in Kendall, there are a number of intuitively
appealing reasons for thinking that the court got it right: the chil
dren's expressed religious preference, the father's unwillingness to
keep to his premarriage bargain,38 the suspicion that the father was
using his children against the mother, and the p erverse and outra
geous behavior of shaving off his son's payes. 39 This view of the
freedom at stake may indeed make Kendall a special case. In fact,
it suggests that Kendall is an easy case the other way: the child's
best interest trumps the child's freedom claim, a claim that has less
value than an adult's freedom claim. If the general rule is noninter
ference, here interference might have been more appropriate.
35. The constraint here is not the order, per se, but the substitution of the government for
the parents as the children's representative. See p. 118 ("[W]hen the government steps into
R's shoes . . . X is not free").
36. P. 122. It is not clear what standard Garvey uses to measure callousness, selfishness,
and evil, however, since he had earlier thrown out any objective measure. See supra notes
19-20 and accompanying text. It would seem that any inquiry into a representative's motives
along these measures would be a back door into precisely the type of governmental interfer
ence Garvey does not like. It should be noted, however, that because freedom is not univer
sal for Garvey, this back door is permissible in areas that are unfree. In religious choices,
Garvey might argue, the back door is not open.
37.
122.

P.

122. But in such cases, Garvey adds, the child "though better off, is not free."

P.

38. Indeed, making a kind of estoppel argument, the court somewhat illogically cited
these two reasons as proof that its decision did not amount to a preference. See Kendall v.
Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (Mass. 1997).
39.

Payes

are earlocks worn for religious reasons.
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Two considerations make accepting this view problematic. First,
it glosses over the preliminary question of whose freedom is at
stake, the child's or the representative's. Second, while Garvey
leaves open the general possibility that representatives might be cal
lous, selfish, or evil, and that the government might be permitted to
inquire into such motives, he does not specifically allow such an
inquiry into the motives behind religious decisionmaking. Indeed,
because in his view freedom is particular and not universal, Garvey
may permit such governmental inquiries in nonreligious decision
making, but not as to religious action.40 It is therefore unclear
whether Garvey's theory would discard the general rule of govern
mental noninterference on this basis.
Choice. Garvey's rejection of the primacy of choice is a final
plausible reason for believing that Kendall might be an exception to
the general rule. Governmental noninterference in this case would
provide the children with a choice between religions. For Garvey,
however, the fact that exposure to religion is a good act does not
entail the corollary that exposure to more religions is better.41 For
this reason, it is at least arguable that Garvey would not recognize
the value in exposure to two very different faiths and would there
fore endorse the court's order.
Admittedly, this argument is not terribly strong and probably
would not permit escape from the general rule of governmental
noninterference under Garvey's theory. The argument provides no
rule, for example, for deciding which faith gets the governmental
stamp of approval. Empirically speaking, too, it is at least open to
question in what sense a child's simultaneous exposure to two reli
gions detracts from his practice of either.
In any case, the real utility of the argument comes in helping to
illustrate that views about freedom do not resolve themselves
neatly into the poles of the Agnostic and Believer's Viewpoints.
Consider two points. First, in a perverse sense, the court gives reli
gion the special place that Garvey desires. After all, the probate
court judge found "directly contradictory messages from trusted
adults to be solidly contrary to [the children's] best interests," yet
her order prohibited only contradictory religious messages.42 If the
court subscribed to the Agnostic Viewpoint, it would have treated
religion as merely one choice among many that are integral in con
stituting the human. Furthermore, the opinion reveals that the
court did not make a god out of choice as an adherent of the AgSee supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
Cf. p. 122 (discussing the absurdity of exposing the child of Muslim parents to "Sun·
day School and pork chops" to ensure his religious freedom).
42. Kendal� 687 N.E.2d at 1235 (quoting probate court's findings of fact) (internal quota
tion marks omitted).
40.

41.
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nostic Viewpoint would. Indeed, it is by denying choice that the
court hoped to accomplish its end of safeguarding identity. In this
sense, it is not autonomy that informs what it is to be human, but
state-enforced acceptance of one group identity over another.
These two points - regarding autonomy and the special place
of religion - suggest three Viewpoints, not two. Massachusetts
precedent prior to Kendall seems to match the Agnostic Viewpoint.
The precedent held that exposing children to the separate faiths of
divorced parents was a healthy thing.43 It assumed that autonomy
and choice are the purposes of freedom, and its "metatheory of
goodness" was to maximize the possibilities open to children when
they were able and allowed to choose (p. 117). Such choices were
deemed to be good because autonomy builds or is expressive of
identity. For this reason, Massachusetts courts did not interfere in
decisions regarding children's religious upbringing in the context of
divorce. Garvey, on the other hand, advocates the Believer's View
point. He contends that exposing children to parental religion is a
good act, that freedom protects this good act, and that courts have a
duty not to interfere. The Kendall court by contrast reflected
neither of these views. The court allowed that freedom may consist
of choice - though not because autonomy builds identity. Indeed,
autonomy was found to be a threat to the children's "Jewish self
identity." The court further allowed that freedom may mean non
interference, but not because exposing children to parental religion
is intrinsically good. Rather, the court found religion only instru
mentally good. Thus, the court's viewpoint ultimately is not about
freedom; it is about choosing beneficial psychological - and pur
portedly neutral - outcomes.44

CONCLUSION
This last viewpoint, the one actually taken by the Kendall court,
is the one Garvey might have found most objectionable had he con
sidered it. The yardstick - the best-interest-of-the-child standard
- is the problem.45 For all its appearance of neutrality, the court's
evaluation was not neutral, because it assumed the supremacy of a
43. See Kendal� 6'07 N.E.2d at 1235 ("[T]he law sees a value in 'frequent and continuing
contact' of the child with both its parents and thus contact with the parents' separate religious
preferences.") (quoting Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607 (1981) (citations omitted)
(quoting In re Marriage of Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 80 (Ct. App. 1980) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting CAL. CIV. CooE § 4600 (West 1979)))).
44. One might question, among other things, whether it is likely that psychology is able to
produce more "objective" and less value-laden conclusions about psychological health than
religion can produce about spiritual health.

45. For another criticism of this standard, see Elster, supra note 34, at 7 (describing the
standard as "indeterminate, unjust, self-defeating, and liable to be overridden by more gen
eral policy considerations").
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secular psychological valuation over a religious valuation, the Be
liever's Viewpoint. Furthermore, the court suggested that freedom
is good and relevant only insofar as it produces psychologically ac
ceptable results.46 Under this view, religion is no more than a tool
to service the child's psychological need.
Garvey would question this lack of attention to the child's spiri
tual health. He would question the inherent cruelty of laws contra
vening religious practices and having consequences in the
Hereafter.47 He would contend that the government should with
draw because, as one commentator has said, "a court can't possibly
decide what is good for a child's religious identity. It has no more
insight into that question than you and I."48 Finally, he would ask,
what principled objection could this stance raise to a radical neu
trality that either prohibits religious instruction altogether or
chooses a third nonparental religion in which to raise the child?
Though the dichotomy between Agnostic and Believer's View
points does not fully explain Kendall, this fact does not entirely
elude Garvey. Where there is a measure of incompatibility be
tween religions, a contest of good versus good, one representative's
religion versus another representative's religion, perhaps freedom,
whatever its purpose, by necessity gets thrown out the window.
Perhaps some decision as a practical matter needs to be made be
cause a child simply cannot effectively practice both representa
tives' religions simultaneously. As Garvey indicates in a slightly
different context, it may be true at that point that the Kendall chil
dren are psychologically better off, but it is important to note that
- by his standards - they are no longer free.
- Scott D. Pomfret

46. Indeed, in this case, in which no harm had yet been visited on the children, the court's
position is still stronger: freedom is only good and relevant insofar as it creates less risk of
psychologically unacceptable outcomes.
47. "To one who believes . . . the vice of the law is that it requires believers to do a bad
thing." P. 188.
48. Marquand, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting University of Michigan Law School Professor
Carl Schneider) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S.872, 886-87 (1990) (rejecting the propriety of discerning, and a court's ability to discern,
what is central to a religion).

